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Anti-Fascism and Prefigurative Ethics 
 
Benjamin Franks1 
 
Abstract 
 
There is a tension between rival anti-fascist praxes: social 
democratic, orthodox Marxist and indeed some anarchist 
movements privilege consequentialist approaches because the 
goal of defeating fascism is viewed as the supreme value, whilst 
most anarchists and heterodox Marxist approaches have tended to 
support prefigurative methods. This paper clarifies the concept of 
prefiguration to illustrate the differences and conflicts between 
these anti-fascist approaches and the possibilities of a 
convergence. In doing so it identifies and replies to some of the 
main criticisms of prefigurative anti-fascism. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The main theme of this paper is the tension within militant anti-fascism between, 
on one side, achieving a predetermined outcome (consequentialism) as 
effectively as possible and, on the other, supporting a prefigurative approach to 
politics which is usually considered to be incompatible with such instrumentalism 
(regarding an activity or person as valuable only in so far as it brings about a 
stated purpose). In analysing this opposition between goal driven politics and 
prefigurative (anti-)politics, a number of subsidiary issues are explored: first (1), 
this paper defends ethical approaches to the evaluation of (anti-)political 
tactics, and in doing so (2) develops a coherent moral framework for making 
evaluative assessments, based on prefigurative ethics. Then, (3) after identifying 
a cogent account of fascism, it (4) demarcates different types of anti-fascism, 
highlighting key differences based on respective commitments to prefiguration 
or consequentialism. By using an ethical mode of evaluation (5) the paper 
identifies weaknesses in both the main forms of consequentialist anti-fascism and 
limited (internal) forms of radical prefigurative anti-fascism; however, an area of 
convergence is also identified which provides positive examples of goods-rich 
anti-fascist practice. By “goods” we mean those relationships and 
characteristics that have an intrinsic value (such as the virtues of compassion, 
integrity, wisdom and bravery) as well as resources that assist individual and 
social flourishing, but are not inherently desirable. 
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The final section (6) defends this consistent account of prefigurative anti-fascism 
against criticisms that it: (i) is incapable of adequately prioritising between 
competing goals and thus leaves prefigurative activists in a state of stasis, (ii) is 
capable of supporting fascist actions as they can prefigure desirable social 
relations and values, (iii) becomes inconsistent with covert “squad” activities – 
the modes of organisation usually associated with radical anti-fascism, (iv) 
substitutes elite agents for broader (more traditional) accounts of radical 
subjects, (v) inconsistently violates rights and (vi) is contradictory in supporting 
violence. Instead this paper argues that fascism is inconsistent with the virtues, 
that the squad tactics can be consistent with the virtues and are non-
paternalistic nor substitutionalist – and that radical anti-fascism is compatible 
with a proportionate violation of rights of organised fascisms and in its selective 
use of violence. 
 
This paper was written in Dumfries, the largest town in Southwest Scotland. 
Despite a brief period of high fascist activism in the region in the 1930s 
(Livingston 2013), its location close to the sectarian rivalries in the Six Counties, 
and significant far-right support just south of the border in Cumbria,2 organised 
fascism is not, currently, a significant force.3  However, in the run up to the 2010 
local elections, British National Party (BNP) activists began leafleting in Dumfries 
and surrounding towns. This followed the BNP’s electoral success in England, 
winning representation in the European Parliamentary elections in 2009 (though 
one of its members defected to the very similar British Democratic Party (BDP) 
and representation on the Greater London Assembly. In 2013, the Scottish 
Defence League (SDL), a smaller and feebler version of the ultra-nationalist 
English Defence League (EDL), organised an anti-Muslim rally against a 
proposed extension of use for Dumfries’s only mosque (Dalziel 2013). Both these 
cases of far-right mobilisation ignited debate and initiated counter-action from 
the small, loose, local network of militants. 
 
In Dumfries, like the rest of the UK, active anti-fascists come largely (but not 
exclusively), from a wide spectrum of the left, with the more militant sections 
(those willing to engage in direct confrontation) identifying with variants of 
Trotskyism, autonomist Marxism and social anarchism. The main anti-fascist 
bodies tend to reflect these positions. Social democrats tend to support the 
National Assembly Against Racism (NAAR) and previously the Anti-Racist 
Alliance (ARA), Searchlight4 and Hope Not Hate. Trotskyists, such as supporters of 
the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) operate through the Anti-Nazi League (ANL) 
(Renton 2006); and social anarchists, plus a section of dissident Marxists, the Anti-
Fascist Network (AFN) (Anti-Fascist Network 2014), its precursor Antifa and 
formerly the Anti-Fascist Action (AFA) (Anti-Fascist Action 2014; Copsey 2011a, 
125). The NAAR and the ANL are involved in United Against Fascism (UAF), a 
“broad-based national campaign… [that includes] various faith groups, such as 
the Muslim Council of Britain, the TUC and numerous MPs/MEPs… its original 
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sponsors included Conservative MPs Michael Howard [and] David Cameron” 
(Copsey 2011a, 133). Michael Howard and David Cameron as Conservative 
Party leaders employed electoral strategist Lynton Crosby who successfully 
deployed anti-immigrant rhetoric for the Australian Liberal Party and now 
employs similar imagery in the UK context (Muir 2012).  
 
The recent fascist episodes in Dumfries prompted two different forms of reaction 
from anti-fascists. The first, consequentialist approach, was to drop every other 
political activity, included a long-planned set of cultural events, in order to 
concentrate on direct opposition to the “Nazi threat.” Countering fascist threats, 
no matter how minor, was the supreme goal. Within this position there were 
disagreements on whether constitutional action or direct confrontation was 
most effective, though usually one was seen as supporting the other.  
 
The second, prefigurative approach, considered that the best way of 
countering the rise of xenophobic, authoritarian attitudes was not necessarily 
through always prioritising direct contestation but to further develop radical 
social practices that were based on different, inclusive and anti-hierarchical 
values. These activities included union-building and developing community 
events like free festivals, film and cultural nights with egalitarian socio-economic 
and multi-ethnic emphases. Ethical analysis is used to identify and assess the 
differences between prefigurative and consequentialist anti-fascism and to 
indicate areas of convergence. 
 
1. Defence of Ethical Analysis 
 
Ethics,5 which is principally concerned with how we treat others as well as 
developing ourselves, and moral analysis which identifies and applies a cogent, 
inter-subjective basis for making choices, is inherent to political decisions when 
different tactics are being discussed. Yet there is reluctance by theorists and 
activists to overtly identify that moral criteria are being used in categorising and 
evaluating anti-fascist methods. Partly, this is due to ethical analysis being 
viewed as an elite discourse that inappropriately imposes forms of censure and 
approval from positions disconnected from the lived experiences of those 
affected. This is driven, perhaps, by the (mis-) conception that religious 
institutional hierarchies claim morality as their exclusive domain, or that it is a 
discourse specific to – and supportive of – the elitist institutions and practices of 
academia. 
 
It is true that although the spectre of Nazism looms large in academic, moral 
philosophy and frames Western ethical thinking (see Glover 2001), there has 
been a general decline amongst the higher-ranking ethics journals, especially 
those in the Anglo-American tradition, of discussion of radical political action.6  
Politically-engaged post-structuralism, by contrast, provides the rare occasions 
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that overt interest in the ethics of anti-fascism is still core to discussions of radical 
political action. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus has its origins in 
anti-fascism, as Michel Foucault (1984, xiv-xv) identifies. Borrowing from post-
structuralism, the ethical approach embraced here also identifies anti-fascism 
with the development of anti-authoritarian everyday activities rather than simply 
a negation of a particular form of totalizing state politics (xv). However, the 
identification of fascism and anti-fascism with micropolitical everyday life 
activities, risks losing the specificity of the term.7  As a result many recent 
analyses of post-structural contributions to moral theory, even those excavating 
Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault make little reference to fascism (see for instance 
May 1995). 
 
As is developed later, the moral framework applied here, like Foucault, 
concentrates on the construction of identities and goods inherent in lived social 
practices, from those constructed by practitioners (labour). It is deduced from 
more general philosophical sources, in particular the virtue ethical tradition 
associated with Aristotle (1976) and elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre (1985 and 
1988), rather than one based specifically on anti-fascism. The ethical account is 
developed by reference to debates on direct action, prefiguration and militant 
action from other disciplines. 
 
One of the strengths of contemporary (post-1973) British anti-fascism is that it is a 
topic that has been left largely to activists, such as Sean Birchall (2000), Dave 
Hann (2013),  Jim Kelly (nd), Martin Lux (2006), Mark Metcalf (nd) and Steve Tilzey 
(Hann and Tilzey 2003). There are few notable exceptions, with significant 
contributions by scholars such as Nigel Copsey (2011a), Mark Hayes (2000) and 
Dave Renton (2006). It is important to note that the distinction between 
activist/academic is not immutable: Renton and Hayes, for instance, identify as 
both. Because contemporary anti-fascist writings often come from an activist 
perspective, they have an immediacy, vitality and relevance. Their political 
commitments are more openly expressed, in contrast to the supposedly 
dispassionate theoretical disciplines that tend to cloak their ideological positions 
(Freeden 1996, 27-28). 
 
Nonetheless, there is in some activist accounts an implicit or explicit criticism that 
by introducing ethical analysis, a form of evaluation is imposed which is external 
to the activity and emanates from privileged social positions. Because this form 
of analysis has its origins in academia it has an implicit ideological bias that is 
prejudicial to anti-hierarchical and/or grass-roots perspectives. It is partly for this 
reason that political activists, from Leon Trotsky (1979, 13 and 15-16) to Class War 
members, dismiss “moralism” (M. H. 2002). There are a number of replies to this 
criticism. 
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First, the perception that ethical principles derived from one social practice, 
such as those of academic activity, are necessarily elite and limited to these 
practices ignores the fact that they are often formed from university workers 
who are not immune from economic oppression (see McLaughin 2010) or the 
threat of fascism. Academic practices are not isolated (despite the popularity of 
the metaphor of the separated ‘ivory tower’), but intersect with other social 
practices (sometimes to the detriment of either or both partners). 
 
The second reply is that the dismissal of “moralism” is not a rejection of moral 
reasoning. Those who rightly reject “moralism,” however, such as Trotsky, Class 
War members or individualist anarchists like Jason McQuinn, a founder of the 
prominent American radical journal Anarchy: A journal of desire armed, are 
usually rejecting particular meta-ethical positions rather than ethical analysis in 
total. For Trotsky, “moralism” is associated with spurious claims to universal norms 
as an ideological (and theological) attempt to obscure differences in material 
situations. In contrast Trotsky embraces an overt consequentialism based on the 
defeat of fascism as a necessary condition for proletarian revolution. “Whoever 
accepts the ends: victory over Franco, must accept the means: civil war with its 
wake of horrors and crimes” (Trotsky, 1979, 36). For McQuinn (2004-5) the 
rejection of “moralism” is a dismissal of attempts to impose universal solutions 
from a totalizing political perspective. However, McQuinn too proposed an 
alternative ethical system. Initially, he proposes subjectivism (prioritising the 
judgement of an individual’s conscience), but then – and in tension with this – 
proposes a moral imperative to gain “self-understanding.” Subjectivism is 
problematic: although superficially attractive, it would mean prioritising an 
individual’s own experiences, needs and desires, and thus could justify an 
individual’s commitment to racist or other oppressive beliefs that meet their 
immediate interests. 
  
However, a more sympathetic reading recognises that McQuinn’s anti-
universalism also includes a materialist recognition that social practices develop 
individual identities and values. Similarly, Class War’s former members M. H. 
(2002) and Paul Marsh (2002), whilst disagreeing on organisational changes, use 
a shared ethical analyses based on virtues theory, to argue for social practices 
that privilege “co-operation”, “trust” and “honesty.” 
 
Whilst radicals utilise ethical discourses, especially in debates around anti-fascist 
methods, their theoretical framework is rarely made explicit. In this paper the 
theoretical structure captures the features of Trotsky’s emphasis on materialism 
and McQuinn’s anti-universalisms, without the dangers of a strict instrumentalism 
or an individualist subjectivism, both of which can justify any action (so long as it 
efficiently achieves goals, or is approved by individual conscience). It is best 
captured, in an anti-hierarchical virtue ethics, borrowing from MacIntyre.  
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2. The Prefigurative Ethical Framework: Practice-based virtue theory  
 
As noted elsewhere MacIntyre’s virtue ethics shares strong family resemblances 
with radical prefigurative approaches (Blackledge 2012, 596; Franks 2010; Swann 
2013, 678-79). Prefiguration stresses that means are consistent with or 
synecdochic of goals. The types of values (virtues) that sustain a flourishing 
community are achieved by being practised in the here and now.  
 
Virtue theory recognises that stable, but adaptable norms as well as material 
resources are needed to maintain a social practice and for participants to 
improve or gain perfection (arête) in that social activity (MacIntyre 1985, 187). 
For instance, playing chess requires some minimal materials (chess-boards, 
pieces, shared language) and rules and objectives. Thus one can identify not 
just what makes a move a “good” or a “poor” one, in terms of the goal of the 
practice (to checkmate the opponent), but also enable the development of 
positive inter-personal traits, such as patience, analytic skills and good 
sportsmanship, that enable the practice and adjacent ones to flourish (188). If 
people were to continually cheat at chess, or face abuse across the board, 
then fewer would opt to participate and the practice would wither (193). 
 
Engagement in a social practice alters the identity of the subject, developing 
their social traits (virtues), for instance wisdom, compassion and bravery. 
Different social practices develop different combinations of virtues, with none 
universally at the fore. Over time new virtues arise (for instance concern for 
animals) and others decline in importance (piety, perhaps). So every meaningful 
social activity necessarily includes an ethic, which is, at least in part, inter-
subjective. 
 
The sociologist Andreas Reckwitz (2002), with reference to Foucault and Pierre 
Bourdieu, views practices in similar ways to MacIntyre (243). They are stable 
combinations of resources (materials, technologies), competencies (knowledge, 
skills, and techniques) and shared meanings (including ideas and values) (249-
50). Practice approaches avoid the epistemological and ontological problems 
of viewing agents as either wholly autonomous or totally determined, 
recognising how being involved in a practice limits choices and viewpoints, 
generates particular discourses and identities, but offers the possibility of 
transcending and altering that practice. Whilst for MacIntyre (1985, 221-22) 
stable (but reflective and adaptable) practices develop into traditions, for 
Reckwitz (2002), they constitute a social structure (256).  
 
However, what is unclear in Reckwitz’s account is whether there is an overriding 
teleology to the generation, sustenance and modification of social practices. 
For much of MacIntyre’s work, benevolent social practices are tied to a 
universal goal of the good. The MacIntyre scholar and sophisticated Leninist 
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Paul Blackledge (2012) argues that without a clear teleology, concentration on 
practices alone could end up in “social dislocation” (596) and “justify some very 
conservative projects” (597). For Blackledge, to avoid the “simulacra of 
morality”, a teleology based on MacIntyre’s earlier (but rejected) Marxism is 
recommended (599;  Blackledge and Davidson 2008, xix). A point which will be 
returned to, as having a clear predetermined goal becomes the basis of 
consequentialist political action.  
 
A practise-based virtue approach is consistent with the critical discourse of 
oppressed groups who frequently use core moral values to describe, evaluate, 
organise and agitate for more desirable social relations. It is for this reason that 
anarchists and heterodox Marxists are interested in autovalorisation, the 
generation and sustenance of non-hierarchical values by agents themselves 
which are distinct from those of the dominant class. For instance, fascist groups 
are variously criticised for their vices: cowardice and intemperance, injustice 
and lack of theoretical wisdom (see for instance “Malatesta” 2009; Class War 
2006a). By contrast, radical action is identified with virtues such as compassion, 
courage and justice (See for instance Q. SHAC in SchNEWS 2009; SchNEWS 2010; 
SchNEWS  2011). 
 
Ethical analysis is not universally a better approach to more standard, (auto-) 
ethnographic, political scientific and historical accounts of anti-fascism, though 
ethics informs, and is informed by, these disciplines. With a topic as formidable 
as anti-fascism, no singular disciplinary approach is wholly adequate. The use of 
ethical analysis highlights how moral features – though often overlooked – are 
already present in activist discourse. An evaluation and systematic application 
of moral theory can assist in the clarification of debates and the assessment and 
development of anti-fascist methods. 
   
3. Identifying fascism and anti-fascism 
 
In order to discuss anti-fascism, it is necessary to first identify “fascism.” Providing 
a clear definition of fascism is not easy as the label is applicable to diverse 
movements: from conservative, constitutionalist and pluralist movements to 
revolutionary, totalitarian and genocidal parties. Since the late 1990s, fascist 
groups such as the BDP, BNP, English Democrats and EDL have largely 
concentrated on lawful methods, operating through state-democratic 
procedures and emphasised “cultural difference” rather than ethnic superiority 
(Hann and Tilzey 2003, 274; Nigel Copsey, 2011b, 5). These changes have 
prompted some theorists to use the term “post-fascism” (Griffin, 1996). 
 
Roger Griffin’s (1995) solution to such diversity is to seek out a “fascist minimum” 
to identify appropriate groups. For Griffin the motif of paligenesis, a revitalising 
myth or rebirth out of collapse is a permanent, identifying feature of fascism (2-
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3). However, whilst it is pervasive, it might not be universal, as a fascist party that 
has gained power for substantial periods, such as General Franco’s Falange 
Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista finds 
that the myth of national rebirth is harder to sustain. Other movements, too, use 
concepts of national rebirth, especially after cataclysms, without having the 
character of fascist movements. 
 
An alternative method is based on Michael Freeden’s (1996) conceptual 
account. Freeden proposes that ideologies are stable, but changing structures 
of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts (77-78). They are expressed through 
and constituted by words or other signs (48-49). The arrangement of concepts 
helps to define one against the other, so changes in the positioning of one 
concept will influence the interpretation of neighbouring ones (Freeden 2003, 
51-53). According to Freeden, certain core concepts of an ideology are 
“ineliminable.” Liberalism contains liberty, progress and the individual as core 
concepts, not because this is metaphysically ordained but because currently all 
liberal proponents and critics identify these as core (61-62). However, apparently 
necessary characteristics can, over time, slip into the periphery. Consequently, 
Freeden has a more complex account of fascism that is not built on any 
universal minimum but a set of stable, mutually defining concepts: 
 
[A]ggressive nationalism at the disposal of the state and its 
henchmen, a cult of the leader (Il Dulce), terror and physical 
violence and a myth of regeneration that resurrected the past 
glories of Rome and promised national rebirth. The German variant, 
National Socialism, was more methodical both in its ideology and its 
practical realization. It added to the above a racial myth. (91) 
 
These characteristics are understood in relation to one another, terror operates 
through, and in support of, the state in order to maintain the power of the 
leader whose rule is legitimised by the myth of regeneration (the principle of 
palingenesis referred to earlier by Griffin). In some contexts the racial myth 
becomes a core principle, helping to provide a pseudo-scientific legitimacy to 
the social hierarchy and to flesh out the myth of regeneration. In other contexts, 
such as more recent British fascism, terror and physical violence is (temporarily) 
less overt with democratic nationalism providing a basis for state rebirth and a 
marker of ethno-cultural superiority.  
 
Consistent with Foucault’s earlier account, fascism seeks to be a totalising force 
but of a particular kind. It is one that tries to reshape all human activity, whether 
in public or private sphere, to conform to singular principles and social structure. 
The state is central to this attempt, as it is the pivotal apparatus for imposing 
fascist principles onto all social practices and eliminating those which do not or 
cannot conform. Where totalitarian states are successful, counter concepts, 
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such as equality, rights or tolerance are wholly excluded from the popular 
vocabulary, restricting the ways in which subjects can interpret their social world 
(92). 
 
“Anti-fascism” is a category which is usually defined in a negative-
consequentialist manner. That is to say, it judges the rightness of an action 
insofar as it prevents a bad outcome – fascism – from occurring/persisting. This is 
the approach of the UAF and ANL, who are largely reactive, responding to 
fascist movements in whatever guise they take – street mobilisations in the 1970s 
and 1980s, or constitutionally in the 2000s (Copsey 2011a, 123-24; Copsey 2011b, 
2 and 6). However, the approach here is to also see it as a label for political 
practices which conflict with the core principles and methods of fascism. Thus 
“anti-fascism” need not just be the deliberate goal but as a set of contrary 
methods. 
 
Freeden’s method, which is also used by Copsey (2010, xx), can be used to 
counter the instrumentally of standard accounts. Copsey, too, rejects Griffin’s 
minimum and regards “anti-fascism” to have multiple forms and meanings 
dependent on the subjects’ identification. Anti-fascism can be constitutional 
action for control of the state or physical confrontation but also “passive” forms: 
debates and promotion of literature. Whilst Copsey (2010, xvi) draws on Julie 
Gottleib’s (2010) work on feminism and anti-fascism, it is only its overt 
confrontation with fascism which constitutes anti-fascism. However, it is possible 
to see, contra Copsey, that other feminist practices, which are based on notions 
of equality, generate spaces which are antipathetic to fascist discourses. 
Feminist traditions, whilst not primarily intended to be “anti-fascist” (fascism 
might be just a peripheral concern at the time) nonetheless constitute a form of 
micropolitical “anti-fascism.” Anti-instrumentalist approaches recognise that the 
production and maintenance of social practices based on principles 
incompatible with fascism, even if they are not constructed primarily with this 
intention, can also be considered a form of anti-fascism. 
 
The consequentialist account of anti-fascism is a thin category that can include 
authoritarian movements. As a result, problems arise when oppressive secular 
and theocratic movements appear on anti-fascist mobilisations. Reactions to 
their appearance vary. Some regard these autocratic parties as: 1) just another 
face of totalitarianism which need to be equally confronted; 2) an evil but of 
locally less significance than European fascists because of their lack of actual or 
potential material support or, 3) a position associated with brands of state-
socialism, a potential source of allies (see for instance the discussion at Libcom 
2005; Class War 2006b). 
 
Fascists point to the totalitarian sections of their opposition, as a way of 
portraying themselves more favourably (BDP 2013). The far-right is also dismissive 
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of anti-racist policies of democratic liberalism, which tolerates gross social and 
economic inequalities (Imnokuffar 2013). Thus in order to demarcate a 
contemporary radical anti-fascism, it is first necessary to recognise and 
distinguish it from forms of anti-fascism that replace one totalising, hierarchical 
myth with another, including those tied to economic-liberal principles. 
 
4. Identifying Anti-Fascism 
 
In Dumfries in 2010, it was largely the anti-state radicals who initially began the 
debate on anti-fascist tactics, with orthodox Marxists and social democrats 
quickly contributing. A division, though fluid in terms of membership, between 
the state-centred social democrats and orthodox Marxists on one side and more 
heterodox Marxists and social anarchists on the other mapped neatly the 
division between the consequentialist and prefigurative anti-fascists. 
 
The latter subgrouping, identified as radical, because of their scepticism (and 
indeed opposition) to statist mediation is usually distinguished from more 
conventional political positions through its adherence to four core principles, 
those of: (i) being anti-state, which demarcates it from Leninism and social 
democracy; (ii) rejecting capitalism, which distinguishes it from neo-liberalism; 
(iii) having a fluid, social view of the self, in which one’s identity shifts in response 
to material context, including how other subjects respond, which distinguishes it 
from subjectivism; and iv) having a commitment to prefigurative methods. 
Prefiguration involves using means that are in accordance with the goals, 
creating in the present desired for features of the future (Quail 1978, x; Franks 
2006, 12-13). Alongside and consistent with these four principles is a fifth: (v) 
scepticism of universal claims to knowledge, as demonstrated by McQuinn’s 
(2004-5) anti-universalism, but also found in the more popular socialist anarchist 
traditions following Michael Bakunin (1970, 32). Claims to authority based on 
knowledge can be justified in demonstrable contexts, however as there is no 
position in which universal knowledge is discernible, there is scepticism towards 
groups claiming to know what is always best for others. This leads to a general 
critique of representationalism (31-33). 
 
Prefiguration has become one of the core features of contemporary analysis of 
radical movements (Shukaitis 2010, 62; Gordon 2007, 34-36), it is a core principle 
in making preferences on tactics and organisation forms. It is the commitment to 
the principle of prefiguration that unites autonomism and anarchism (Gautney 
2009, 478). It marks a division between standardly anarchist, tactical 
approaches and the consequentialism of orthodox Marxism. For Trotsky, like 
Lenin, considered there was a significant division between revolutionary means 
and revolutionary ends, which anarchists and autonomists have tended to 
reject (Lenin 1963, 149; Trotsky 1979, 36). 
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Prefiguration does not reject the importance of external goods to social 
practices. Activities like cooking have external goods (completed dishes) which 
can become resources to other aligned social practices. However, the benefits 
of a culinary education are not reliant on the production of external goods 
alone. A cooking experience that was intimidating and cruel would not be 
justified solely on the basis that it generated attractive dishes. As MacIntyre 
(1985) explains, the virtues are those inter-personal qualities that are desirable in-
themselves but also generate other types of good. Even though it is likely that 
the development of virtuous practices will generate good outcomes, these 
consequentialist goods should not be the sole motivation for acting virtuously 
(196). Instrumentalism undermines goods-rich social relationships (198-99). 
 
There are a number of conflicting interpretations of prefiguration, which have 
confused the debate. Marianne Maeckelbergh (2011) points to a number of 
competing definitions, initially defining prefiguration as a type of epistemology: 
 
Prefiguration is not a theory of social change that first analyses the 
current global political landscape, develops an alternative model in 
the form of a predetermined goal, and then sets out a five-year 
plan for changing the existing landscape into a predetermined 
goal. Prefiguration is a different kind of theory, a “direct theory”… 
that theorizes through action, through doing. (3) 
 
This could be a very amorphous definition, as almost anything can constitute a 
“doing”; even the abstract, goal-driven theorising that Maeckelbergh rejects is 
a type of rule-governed activity. However, it is clear from the examples 
Maeckelbergh draws from the anarchist anthropologist David Graeber that it is 
a method akin to an immersive practice-based analysis consistent with 
Reckwitz’s method. It is through engagement in an activity (or a closely aligned 
one), understanding its norms, skills, resources and values, that provides expertise 
in that area and allows for experienced practitioners to potentially transform 
that practice.  
 
Maeckelbergh’s epistemological account, which echoes Bakunin’s account of 
the limits to legitimate authority of knowledge, includes the rejection of 
identifying a single universal goal, which legitimises all political action (Bakunin 
1970, 30). However, Maeckelbergh (2011) is critical of accounts of prefiguration 
which reject strategy. It is mistaken, she argues, to regard strategy as necessarily 
involving the pursuit of a singular goal, despite this being a standard definition of 
strategy (6). Instead, she rightly recognises that radical prefigurative politics has 
broad anti-hierarchical social goals, which are multiple and irreducible (9-11) 
and embodied in their forms of organisation, decision-making, tactical 
development and employment (what Maeckelbergh refers to as “process”) (6-
7). In this respect her account is similar to other autonomist-anarchist accounts 
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that view the ways in which means and ends inform each other as dynamic 
(Garland 2012). 
 
Maeckelbergh’s stress on the importance of identifying goals in order to 
recognise whether the means accurately prefigure them, helpfully assists in 
distinguishing two rival prefigurative approaches. Internal prefiguration 
concentrates on developing practices that are consistent with anti-hierarchical 
norms and it is found in certain individualist- and post- anarchisms (referred to by 
some as “lifestyle anarchism”) (Bookchin 1995), such as Crimethinc (2008), in 
which the identification of explicit social goals is rejected (42). Instead, as Uri 
Gordon (2007) explains, the priority is for the individual to have non-coercive 
experiences in the here-and-now (39).  Commitment to internal prefiguration is 
sometimes considered synonymous with self-indulgence or hedonism (Bookchin 
1995, 27). The second, external prefiguration (based on James Guillaume and 
Bakunin) identifies specific goals, which emerge from and are constituted by 
anti-hierarchical social practices, such as confrontation with oppressive state or 
discriminatory structures, and ensures as far as possible that the methods used 
embody anarchist principles.  
 
Rather than being entirely discrete positions, there are areas of convergence. 
For instance, the Situationist International (1981) promoted a strategy of 
generating ever greater series of happenings (situations) that embody radical 
principles. As the number and extent of the situation grows they confront and 
replace the state, without revolutionary goals being the sole justification for the 
action (Gordon 2007, 39-40). As the generation of anti-hierarchical, autonomous 
action rounds into conflict with totalising forces, this generates goals or 
narratives of contestation and liberation which in turn produce new forms of 
prefigurative practice. Desired goals in the shape of preferred types of social 
organisations, practices and relationships (and the values embedded in these 
forms) are a necessary feature of prefiguration, for without them there is nothing 
to prefigure. 
 
Radical prefiguration is, thus, viewed by exponents as incompatible with fascism; 
however critics, largely from consequentialist backgrounds argue otherwise. 
Sometimes, such criticisms are due to commentators, like the orthodox Marxist 
John Molyneux (2011), confusing the advocates of external prefiguration with a 
small minority of advocates of internal prefiguration and thus regarding all 
advocates of prefigurative direct action as promoting these methods just for 
personal pleasure (68). For others, there are more substantial criticisms based on 
the inadequacy of prefiguration to deal with overt and totalising threats. 
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5. Prefiguration and Anti-Fascism: The areas of conflict 
 
There is a clear conflict between instrumentalist orthodox Marxists and 
prefigurative radicals over tactics and organisation. Blackledge (2010), citing his 
Party comrade Chris Harman, explains why Leninism rejects prefiguration in the 
struggle against capitalism. For Leninists there is one universally privileged area 
of conflict, the battle against capitalism, and a disciplined organisation is 
required to bring about the revolution. Only after the revolution can virtuous 
social-relationships develop. 
 
Because socialism will be achieved once the divisions within the 
working class and between it and other oppressed and exploited 
groups are overcome, there will be no need for revolutionary parties 
in a mature socialist society. By their nature therefore revolutionary 
parties, as opposed to other forms of solidarity, cannot prefigure 
socialism: they are rather a (necessary and transient) instrument in 
the struggle for socialism. (Blackledge 2010; see also Lenin 1975, 7) 
 
Here Blackledge follows Trotsky, who similarly rejects prefigurative methods in 
dealing with the totalising threats of fascism and capitalism. It is necessary to use 
methods which embody social ills like “lying” and “violence” in order to defeat 
these threats (Trotsky 1979, 36). (Whether violence is always a vice is discussed 
later). Anarchists, by contrast, tend to be committed to prefiguration. Whilst 
recognising capitalism as a major, and in most contexts the major form of 
oppression, they argue that prefigurative methods, whilst also good in-
themselves, are also the most likely to avoid the recreation of oppressive social 
conditions (Bakunin 1984, 37-38; Franks 2006, 258-59).  
 
5.1. Consequentialist Approaches 
 
The dominant forms of anti-fascism are often consequentialist: from the 
parliamentary methods of Hope Not Hate to more confrontational methods of 
the ANL. This normative approach uses as the supreme value opposition to 
fascism. It endorses any methods and supporting organisation that most 
effectively meet this overriding goal. For instance Labour MP John Cruddas and 
Nick Lowles (2008), then with the anti-fascist Searchlight magazine, conclude:  
 
The rise of the BNP is not a passing phenomena [sic]. We must now 
debate new strategies for organisation and policy, counter-organise 
on the ground and deal with the material issues that lie behind its 
popular support. Nothing is more important for this movement. 
 
Negative consequentialism concentrates on avoiding bad outcomes, rather 
than advancing specific good goals, so it supports anything short of fascism that 
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restricts or prohibits fascism. In Cruddas and Lowles case it meant revitalising 
electoral support for the British Labour Party. This basic minimal approach 
provides the basis for broad coalitions such as the UAF. 
 
The strength of negative consequentialism, when applied to challenging 
fascism, is that it rightly identifies fascism as a serious harm, which seeks to 
incorporate all social practices under its hierarchical principles. This will result in 
distorting or eradicating many social activities and marginalising and even 
eradicating subject identities that do not fit into the fascist image of the nation-
state. As such this negative target allows for the development of effective, 
broad coalitions. However, there are substantial problems with this approach. 
 
5.2. Problems of Consequentialism 
 
There are three main problems with consequentialist anti-fascism. (1) It identifies 
the wrong goal; (2) by making anti-fascism the supreme value it has an 
inadequate account of risk; (3) consequentialism damages social practices rich 
in internal goods. 
 
An example of the first type of criticism comes from the left-communist Jean 
Barrot (Gilles Dauvé). He argues that contesting fascism as the primary goal 
identifies the wrong target. For Barrot (1992), fascism is an epiphenomenon of 
capitalism; it is “a tendency of Capital which materializes whenever necessary” 
(7). It is a current which becomes stronger when the proletariat’s autonomy is 
reduced (15). Anti-fascists as a result, by using and defending the capitalist state 
as an instrument against fascism, generate the conditions for right-wing 
nationalism to develop and support fascist-like methods (10-11). 
 
Leaving to one side Barrot’s particular diagnosis of the causes of fascism, and 
whether there is just a singular set of objectively-identifiable causes, his critique 
highlights some problems with consequentialism. An anti-fascism which is based 
just on reacting to and nullifying fascism leads to co-operation with the most 
effective forces that can be deployed against the totalitarian opponent, even if 
these forces are themselves authoritarian. As Copsey (2011a) argues, this form of 
anti-fascism does little to undermine the social forces that brought fascist 
movements support. The “‘anyone but fascists’ [policy]…does little to address 
the underlying concerns of a growing minority of disgruntled and alienated BNP 
voters” (135). 
 
Secondly, as the ultimate goal is confronting fascism, and nothing is more 
important, then there is a tendency that a small fascist gathering becomes the 
primary focus of action at the expense of all other activities. Attempts by AFA, to 
move beyond just militant anti-fascism by setting up the Independent Working 
Class Association (Hayes and Aylward 2000, 81-82; Copsey 2011a, 132), were 
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marginalised as consequentialist anti-fascism supports the political opponent 
most likely to outpoll fascist parties (invariably the Labour Party). Alternative 
constitutional movements split the anti-fascist vote (Copsey 2011a, 132). Similar 
radical activities, such as cultural events and protests over welfare issues – which 
might have the foreseeable but not intentional outcome of undermining fascist 
sentiments – have been side-lined by targeted anti-fascism, even when the 
fascist presence was minor. 
 
The alternative has been to restructure all radical activity through adherence to 
the supreme principle of anti-fascism. However, this can distort social practices, 
which have other important shared goods, and are based on other anti-
hierarchical norms and values. A radical film society that shows cinema with a 
range of narratives, themes and aesthetics, becomes didactic and limited if its 
sole goal becomes confronting fascism, especially when that threat is minimal. 
In general the reorientation of a social practice to meet primarily external goals, 
rather than promote internal goods, fundamentally alters that activity. For 
instance playing a sport for the pleasure of competition, comradeship, health, 
skill-development and self-discipline, alters once it is played primarily for the 
totalising goal of profit.  
 
6. Prefiguration: Criticisms 
 
Radical anti-fascists face criticism in relation to their professed commitment to 
prefiguration. These are: (i) whilst external prefiguration promotes methods 
consistent with goals, because it recognises that there are no singular universal 
goals, activists cannot deal with plural goals when they come into conflict, 
especially if the conflict is between overcoming fascism and some other social 
ill, leading to a situation of paralysis or division; (ii) a prefigurative approach 
which emphasises the production of internal goods cannot avoid supporting 
oppressive practices, including those of overt fascist groups, that also produce 
internal goods; (iii) covert organisation, a frequently used method of radical 
anti-fascist groups appears to conflict with prefigurative egalitarian principles; 
(iv) radical anti-fascism substitutes small group action for collective action and 
thus is elitist in contravention of prefiguration; (v) radical anti-fascists violate 
important rights of free association and free speech for racists and thus violates 
prefigurative commitments to liberty, and (vi) radical anti-fascism is often violent 
and as such is incompatible with eventual radical, pacific goals.  
 
i. Inadequacy 
 
There are problems with goal-pluralism, as Thomas Swann (2010a) and 
Blackledge (2012) identify and discuss. Namely, how do activists deal with 
conflicting goals and – related to this question – how is a decision taken on 
prioritising goals, if pluralism is the aim? This is a problem which MacIntyre (1988) 
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also identifies with apparent goal pluralism (347-48). Further, if there are plural 
goals, on what basis can conservative or fascist telē (final targets) be excluded? 
If a single telos is epistemologically suspect and produces bad outcomes, how 
do activists deal with plural goals when they come into conflict? As Swann 
(2010a) identifies, if there is no single over-riding telos, how do competing 
sections of the same movement know whether to prioritise environmental 
campaigns or anti-racist ones? 
 
If the universalist is right … they will be able to measure the 
conflicting goods against this objective yardstick and decide which 
good takes priority at that time. However, without such an external 
guide, deliberation seems meaningless. If the first group claims in 
support of their position that it measures up to the contingent telos 
that solidarity should be primarily with the animal rights movement, 
and the second group claims that theirs measures up to the telos 
that solidarity should be with anti-racism, then there is no way for 
agreement to be reached. (10) 
 
There are a number of possible replies. First, the answer might be found in 
analysis of the actual virtues generated in prioritising one over the other. If there 
is a clear racist threat that would cause a significant social cleavage that 
radical practices are substantially undermined, then to concentrate on animal 
rights would be inconsiderate and irresponsible. If, there is no major racist 
movement and formerly oppressed groups have successfully intervened to 
transform previously discriminatory practices, whilst significant institutions engage 
in callous and cruel treatments of non-humans, including substantial habitat 
destruction, then virtue is most likely to be generated in pursuing the second.  
 
In addition, there will be times when there is no definitive answer, as in different 
locations (historical and geographical) there will be different oppressive forces 
in operation, impacting on different practices and their participants in distinct 
ways. Thus, recognition that different agencies engaged in different practices 
might not have shared priorities in particular moments, does not necessarily 
result in “social dislocation and fragmentation” (Blackledge 2012, 596-97) but a 
feature of modesty where one does not assume the goals, norms and identities 
of one practice necessarily supersede those of others. 
 
Blackledge argues that a socialist teleology is necessary otherwise conservative 
ends could be a part of goal pluralism and thus there are no final grounds for 
advocating radical practices (597, 599; see also Swann 2010b, 240-41). 
However, anti-hierarchical social relations are more likely to generate the virtues 
than reactionary ones (wisdom is the sharing – not the monopolisation – of 
knowledge; liberality (generosity without profligacy) is incompatible with 
selfishness). Recognising that there is a possibility of plural goals being generated 
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by structures of consistent anti-hierarchical social practices is not the same as 
promoting any goal, or that some goals may be more prominent and pertinent 
in specific situations than others.  
 
There are possible areas of convergence between the pluralist, prefigurative 
approach and Blackledge’s consequentialism. For instance, if there is a 
significant totalising threat, such that any social practice risks being subsumed, 
then each potentially oppressed subject has a shared objective. There may well 
be times when liberal capitalism or organised fascism is such a threat. Indeed it 
is hard to identify a location in most Western societies where capitalism does not 
present such a menace. However, it is not always the main or sole oppressive 
force, and thus the promotion of a universal goal is inappropriate and 
producing counter-totalising organisation merely recreates the oppressive social 
relations that radicals are attempting to transcend. 
 
ii. Brave Nazis 
 
One of the most frequent criticisms made of prefigurative approaches, that 
emphasise the generation of internal goods, is that fascists too act courageously 
and (at least amongst themselves) collegially (Rachels 1993, 164; Hinchman 
1989, 653-54). As a result, a commitment to supporting prefigurative attributes 
would allow for brave Nazism, and thus prefigurative, virtue approaches are 
inadequate for responding, and providing an alternative to, fascism. However, 
the criticism overlooks the main feature of the virtues in general is that they 
cannot be isolated, but must be seen in relation to the other virtues. Thus 
fortitude, if it lacks compassion and justice and is based on intellectually facile 
grounds, is bloody-minded, rash and petty -- not magnanimous or courageous.  
 
A bully is not brave, unlike someone standing up to a tormenter. The aggressor 
maintains structures of domination, undermines the development of socially and 
individually-enriching social relationships and access to good-rich practices. The 
person who stands up to discriminatory aggression, so long as it is proportionate 
and well-targeted, is practising solidarity and compassion. Radical anti-fascism is 
primarily concentrated on opposing and negating organised groups who have 
the material forces (in terms of numbers, financing and/or technological 
resources) and intention to intimidate and coerce, promoting irrationality and 
vindictiveness, and undermining diverse social interactions based on mutual 
respect, trust and solidarity. 
 
Practising the virtues, like external prefiguration, produces good outcomes: a 
flourishing individual engaged and promoting further goods-rich activities 
(though this is not necessarily the main intention) (MacIntyre 1985, 190-91). As 
MacIntyre points out, oppressive actions by contrast, undermine virtuous 
practices (193). They discourage initiative and undermine collegial, social 
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interactions; thus fascist activity – even if carried out at personal risk – is not 
virtuous. 
 
iii. Covert Organisation 
 
Anarchists and orthodox Marxists have longstanding and sustained critiques of 
the others’ organisational methods. Anarchists condemn Marxist, centralised 
and hierarchical political structures, but, Marxists point out that Bakunin used 
secretive and conspiratorial organisation, which is even less accountable and 
thus more oppressive (Molyneux 2009). Similarly, Antifa and AFA, whilst being 
open to members (see Hann 2013, 327-29) organise activities covertly, in tightly 
disciplined small groups, to target fascists. In the early 1980s, the ANL split 
between the SWP leadership who opposed such groups and a small group of 
anti-fascist militants who supported them (Copsey 2011a, 125-26). 
 
There are three defences of covert organisational arrangement. The first is that 
such squads are rarely as closed or secretive as critics present. Indeed the 
groupings that construct them are open, public-membership organisations, 
which generate temporary alliances of activists (affinity groups). Supporters 
participate in accordance with their interests and the degree to which they find 
others to share their goals. Membership of the formal organisation (AFN, Antifa or 
AFA) and in particular the affinity groups they produce are fluid and provisional. 
 
Second, unlike the vanguard party, the anti-fascist squad is restricted to a local, 
not universal function. Whilst, the revolutionary party is the universal essential 
organisation, mediating between the client class and the informed leadership 
(Lenin 1963; Blackledge 2010), the anti-fascist squad is localised, specific and 
intersects with other different groups, creating a network of co-existing 
organisations operating on different norms depending on the social 
circumstances. The myriad types of activities that construct confrontational anti-
fascism allow for autonomous engagement in different forms, from being a 
member of a direct action squad, to intelligence gathering to propaganda and 
cultural activities (Hann 2013, 347). 
 
The covert squad is autonomous and primarily accountable to its members and 
those involved in adjacent practices, rather than answerable to a central 
authority. It is this lack of accountability to a hierarchical authority, rather than a 
general refusal to reflect on their own operations, which led orthodox Marxists, 
like the SWP leadership, to reject “squaddism” (316-17). Looking to universal, 
centralised democratic accountability for all actions would be damaging to all 
sorts of legitimate behaviour, undermining the development of responsibility and 
encouraging participants to please the central manager rather than co-
participants. 
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The third defence is that given the situation of state surveillance and localised 
strength of fascist groups, on occasions the only way to effectively respond to 
fascism is through covert practices. The alternative is remaining quiescent or 
subject to arrest (and thus being subject to even greater hierarchical 
treatment). In such circumstances such secretive practices are the most 
prefigurative available. Therefore, the use of limited, covert methods is not 
incompatible with the promotion of other social virtues. 
 
iv. Substitutionalism 
 
Orthodox Marxists have tended to be critical of direct action because it is seen 
to substitute minority action for mass action. Prefiguration, argues Blackledge 
(2010), “is liable to reinforce rather than challenge the propensity to elitism and 
substituionalism: the tendency of activists to substitute their activities for broader 
social movements” (Direct Action and the State). This is because Blackledge 
argues, quoting a supporter of prefigurative approaches, it involves a “small 
part of an entity represent[ing] the whole thing” (Direct Action and the State). 
Thus, for Blackledge, the small part replaces or subsumes the larger goal. 
 
Blackledge (2010) is right to warn of the dangers of the immodesty of small 
groups believing that their actions and those of intimately linked collectives, 
alone are responsible for the success of anti-fascism. This leads to paternalism 
(even dictatorship) (Direct Action and the State). However, prefigurative direct 
action is not substitutionalist in the way he describes. Blackledge’s criticism 
usefully highlights some of the differences between anarchist accounts of 
agency and more orthodox Marxist approaches. 
 
For Blackledge (2010) there is one universal agent of social change, the 
industrial proletariat, with a settled identity, and an objectively analysable 
revolutionary consciousness (Direct Action and the State; Jacobinism, Blanquism 
and Marxism). The successful, democratic revolution is one in which the 
proletariat act as a conscious majority to contest and overthrow capitalism 
(Jacobinism, Blanquism and Marxism). Therefore, direct action which promotes 
localised affected agents taking effective, immediate action to (at least 
partially) resolve or challenge oppressive practices, prior to the democratic 
revolution runs the risk of substituting this minority’s actions for the majority action 
of the industrial working class. 
 
However, in radical prefiguration there is no singular fixed revolutionary identity, 
no unified whole to be substituted. This is not to deny that the proletariat are an 
oppressed class who must overthrow capitalist oppression to be liberated but 
that working class identities are fluid, diverse and contextual (a worker in one 
situation can be imposing the law of value in another). In addition, not all 
oppressions are necessarily reducible to capitalist oppression alone. Thus, in 
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different contexts different groups are the subjugated who should take the 
primary role in contesting oppression. In radical anti-fascism there is the 
acceptance that ethnic groups that have been specifically targeted by 
organised fascists can and should self-organise in defence. For instance, the 
Jewish self-defence groups, like the 43 Group that organised against Oswald 
Moseley and his followers, are an inspiration to non-Jewish radical anti-fascists 
(Hayes and Aylward 2000, 56). 
 
Similarly, when an advocate of prefiguration refers to it as a “small part of an 
entity represents the whole thing”, he is not suggesting that the “small part” 
replaces the entirety (as substitutionalism requires). Instead, as the explanation in 
the rest of the paragraph the quotation comes from explains, the small incidents 
of prefigurative practice are a synecdoche, not a replacement, for greater 
radical actions. Prefigurative action, whilst being a practical response to 
oppressions in a particular locality, is also a “symbol of the larger vision of social 
change” (Franks 2006, 118). 
 
v. Rights and Anti-Fascism 
 
A different set of criticisms arise form Matthew Wilson. He argues that there are 
inconsistencies in radical anti-fascist goals and methods. One of these 
irregularities is that radical anti-fascists explicitly deny freedom of speech and 
assembly to organised racists – and sexists and homophobes – (Wilson 2010, 123-
24) yet anarchism is apparently predicated on a commitment to freedom (116-
17). 
 
Whilst Wilson might be right that in general there are inconsistencies and 
lacunae in radical writings on issues like rights (few significant ideologies can 
avoid some irregularities), he may be mistaken in seeing an inconsistency here. 
Rights are not principles that operate in isolation. Radical principles of freedom, 
as Freeden’s analysis suggest, have to be understood next to the other core 
concepts. For militant anti-fascism these include principles such as the 
contestation of social and economic hierarchies and these take place in – and 
through – social practices. 
 
Thus, the construction and distribution of spoken or written texts are not 
dispassionate exercises in communication but types of action (Phil 2013). Racist 
speech-acts marginalise and exclude sections of society and mark 
geographical regions as restricted to privileged groups. Allowing racists 
opportunities to extend their discriminatory practices would conflict with radical 
principles of contesting hierarchies. Countering fascism can help to develop 
social institutions based on different norms. 
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vi. Non-violence 
 
Some, conservative commentators have suggested that there is an equivalence 
between fascists and militant anti-fascists because of the latter’s willingness to 
use violence (Daily Mail quoted in Hayes and Aylward 2000, 56; see also SWP 
quoted in Kelly nd, 11). The question of the role of violence, and potential 
justifications has long been an area of contention in radical movements, and 
subject to recent thoughtful re-formulations (see for instance Balfour 2013). In 
general, anarchist-pacifists reject the use of violence as incompatible with 
anarchist goals (see for instance Martin 2008; Ostergaard nd), whilst other 
anarchists consider it as necessary and/or desirable (Gelderoos 2007; Churchill 
and Ryan 2007; Lux 2006). 
 
Pacifists, like Brian Martin (2008), point explicitly to the prefigurative principle in 
their rejection of force. As Martin explains, “if the goal is a society without 
organised violence, nonviolent action has all these prefigurative advantages”, 
whilst violent methods “clash with the goal of a nonviolent society” and provide 
“training, experience and legitimacy to violence” (239).  
 
Part of the problem, as advocates and opponents of pacifism recognise, is 
often over definitions. To use Vittorio Bufacchi’s (2005) useful distinction, pacifists 
tend to use a minimal definition of violence (MDV), identifying it with “physical 
force deliberately used to cause suffering or injury” (197), and thus associate 
violence with: “imprisonment, beatings, shootings, bombings and torture” 
(Martin 2008, 237), whilst property destruction is reduced to being “at the 
boundary between violence and nonviolence” (237).8  Non-pacifists draw 
definitions differently, seeing many actions omitted by MDV as violent.  They use 
an account which is closer to Bufacchi’s comprehensive definition of violence 
(CDV). It identifies violence with psychological as well as physical harms and 
violation of rights (positive as well as negative) (Bufacchi 2005, 197-98). CDV can 
also include omissions to act as well deliberate actions.  Thus actions approved 
of by pacifists such as sabotage against property (without intending loss of life) 
are identified as non-violent, whilst for non-pacifists property destruction is a type 
of violence, though a potentially justifiable one. It is for this reason that Reinhold 
Niebuhr (1980), who admires Gandhi’s methods and goals, thinks it is wrong to 
describe Gandhi’s tactics as non-violent, because they economically damage 
and psychologically harm his opponents (247). 
 
CDV seems to omit too little such that any sort of violation can be considered a 
type of violence, losing what is specific about the use of force (Bufacchi 2005, 
197 and 199).  It does however point to potential defences of forcible action. If 
existing practices are part of a tradition or social structure that systematically 
humiliates and excludes social groups, and a minor of act of force disrupts this, 
then the aggressive intervention is the lesser violent option. 
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For pacifists the prefigurative principle states that violence should be rejected as 
a means because it is not a desirable goal. However, certain forms of 
consensual violence (such as mutually agreed sado-masochism, or 
proportionate amateur martial arts) could be part of a set of desirable, future 
social practices. Indeed, the goal might be better thought of as minimising 
hierarchical violence rather than the complete eradication of violence in all its 
forms. The reassertion of anti-hierarchical principles identifies the difference 
between the violence of the oppressor from the violence of those resisting such 
violence but would not permit force that simply replaced one dominating group 
with a new master. 
 
A part of the pacifist criticism of violent anti-fascism is that it includes a structural 
sexism as it prioritises physical confrontation and therefore largely (but not 
exclusively) male attributes of brute strength (Hann and Tilzey 2003, 241; See also 
Kelly nd, 11 and Lux 2006, 73). Whilst some in AFA and Antifa did consider direct 
confrontation to the primary method but point to the inclusion of women in 
physical confrontation (Kelly nd, 11), many instead saw physical confrontation 
as one important method amongst many other radical practices, which require 
different attributes, and thus did not privilege men over women (Hann 2013, 
347). 
 
A further criticism, such as that from Escalate (2011), who unlike Blackledge tend 
to favour prefigurative organisation, justify violent action, but not on 
prefigurative grounds.  
 
When we organise in those groups we try to prefigure the world we 
want to see in our forms of co-operation – we have consensus-
based meetings, we adopt specific vocabulary, we work to avoid 
accidental subordination of participants. Our direct action, 
however, is of a different sort: we don’t want to live in a world of 
smashed glass and burning barricades, but these are necessary 
means for political advance. The trashing of Soho is our “transitional 
demand”, not our utopic end-goal. (9) 
 
Whilst organisational forms should be prefigurative, Escalate argue that 
necessarily violent action, whilst justifiable, is not consistent with prefiguration. 
However, it is not the smashed glass that prefigures the desired objectives, but 
the values of the social relations that are formed and challenged by its 
destruction that are synecdochic of future practices. Bravery and social 
solidarity is found in confronting hierarchical institutions and contesting 
exploitative relationships and sometimes this takes the form of breaking glass. 
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Conclusion 
 
For reasons of economy, this paper did not differentiate all the specific 
perspectives from within radical movements or distinguish between varieties of 
social anarchism and left-communism or the array of Leninisms. Similarly, it has 
not been possible to discuss the full range and distinctions between other 
tactics. Nonetheless, this paper draws out some of the important features of the 
debate between radical anti-fascists about the concept, role and 
epistemological implications of prefiguration. It demonstrates that ethical theory 
is not separate to the debates within radical anti-fascist coalitions but is a 
significant feature of their reflections. 
 
The Leninist tradition, which in contemporary times, largely identifies with Trotsky, 
is based on negative-consequentialism. It dismisses prefiguration as inadequate 
to deal with the threat of fascism. However, the pertinence of prefigurative 
practices has been demonstrated here by showing how “anti-fascism” is not just 
the direct and intentional opposition to totalitarian-nationalism but also includes 
the development of radical, goods-rich social activities that are based on 
principles that are incompatible with fascism. 
 
Consequentialist critics usually identify prefiguration in just the internal sense, with 
a rejection of goals, a form which is inadequate to deal with major threats. 
However, as Maeckelbergh points out, prefiguration usually has external, plural 
goals, with means embodying these desired values and relationships. Plurality of 
goals, does not mean that a situation of stasis arrives or that some goals, such as 
anti-fascism cannot be identified as more pressing in a particular context than 
alternative anti-hierarchical narratives. 
 
There can be convergence between consequentialist approaches and external 
prefigurative ones when the totalising threat of fascism is so great that it risks 
encroaching on a vast range of social practices. In these circumstances, skilled 
practitioners would recognise the threat to their – and adjacent – activities and 
develop appropriate mutually-assisting counter measures. The difference 
between consequentialists and radical (prefigurative) responses is not that the 
latter reject violence or the violation of racists’ rights – as these can be 
consistent with prefiguration – but that for radicals there is no single central 
authority that can legitimately identify a universal goal and sole form of 
organisation to structure appropriate responses.  
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of contemporary British anarchism (AK Press) and co-editor of Anarchism and 
Moral Philosophy (Palgrave Macmillan). 
2 In April 2013, the British National Party (BNP) scored 40% of the vote in Maryport 
South, missing out on a council seat by just 95 votes (Cumbria County Council 
2013). 
3 Leaked BNP membership details show that Dumfries has lower than average 
fascist activism. However, a former BNP supporter, who past affiliations were 
made public by the press, was elected to the local council in 2012. It is unknown 
as to whether his fascist past or his disavowal of it impacted electors’ decisions. 
4 For some of the troubling aspects of Searchlight’s interaction with police 
agencies that also target the radical left see O’Hara (1993) and the magazine 
Notes from the Borderland.  
5 “Morality” and “ethics” are used interchangeably. Whilst in some versions ethos 
(individual character) is distinguished from mores (general principles of right and 
wrong), the practice based virtue approach adopted here (see later) regards 
the value of inter-personal relationships to form – and also constitute – 
productive social activity.  
6 Using JSTOR archive as the basis, between 1961 and 1973, there were 14 
published articles that were dedicated to philosophical analyses of “civil 
disobedience”; in the period 2001-2013, despite the rise in the number of 
philosophy journals there were just two articles with civil disobedience in the title  
7 Foucault elsewhere identifies differences as well as similarities between 
totalising discourses and how, for instance they embody racism, (see for 
instance Michel Foucault 2003, 82-83).  
8 Morris does raise structural violence in a footnote, n4, 253.  
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